David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):301-26 (1994)
I argue for three principle claims. First, philosophers who seek to integrate the semantic and the intentional into a naturalistic metaphysical worldview need to address a task that they have thus far largely failed even to notice: explaining into- level connections between the physical and the intentional in a naturalistically acceptable way. Second, there are serious reasons to think that this task cannot be carried out in a way that would vindicate realism about intentionality. Third, there is much to be said for an irrealist, non-eliminativist, naturalistic approach to intentionality that I call "preservative irrealism"
|Keywords||Epistemology Intentionality Knowledge Naturalism Science Supervenience|
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W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
R. Rorty (1981). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press.
Allan Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Harvard University Press.
David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Alan Weir (forthcoming). Informal Proof, Formal Proof, Formalism. Review of Symbolic Logic:1-21.
Terry Horgan (2010). Transvaluationism About Vagueness: A Progress Report. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):67-94.
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