Naturalism and intentionality

Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):301-26 (1994)
I argue for three principle claims. First, philosophers who seek to integrate the semantic and the intentional into a naturalistic metaphysical worldview need to address a task that they have thus far largely failed even to notice: explaining into- level connections between the physical and the intentional in a naturalistically acceptable way. Second, there are serious reasons to think that this task cannot be carried out in a way that would vindicate realism about intentionality. Third, there is much to be said for an irrealist, non-eliminativist, naturalistic approach to intentionality that I call "preservative irrealism"
Keywords Epistemology  Intentionality  Knowledge  Naturalism  Science  Supervenience
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DOI 10.1007/BF00989833
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