David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):301-26 (1994)
I argue for three principle claims. First, philosophers who seek to integrate the semantic and the intentional into a naturalistic metaphysical worldview need to address a task that they have thus far largely failed even to notice: explaining into- level connections between the physical and the intentional in a naturalistically acceptable way. Second, there are serious reasons to think that this task cannot be carried out in a way that would vindicate realism about intentionality. Third, there is much to be said for an irrealist, non-eliminativist, naturalistic approach to intentionality that I call "preservative irrealism"
|Keywords||Epistemology Intentionality Knowledge Naturalism Science Supervenience|
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
R. Rorty (1981). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press.
Allan Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Alan Weir (forthcoming). Informal Proof, Formal Proof, Formalism. Review of Symbolic Logic:1-21.
Terry Horgan (2010). Transvaluationism About Vagueness: A Progress Report. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):67-94.
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