David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (3):259-265 (2001)
The difficulties with formalizing the intensional notions necessity, knowability and omniscience, and rational belief are well-known. If these notions are formalized as predicates applying to (codes of) sentences, then from apparently weak and uncontroversial logical principles governing these notions, outright contradictions can be derived. Tense logic is one of the best understood and most extensively developed branches of intensional logic. In tense logic, the temporal notions future and past are formalized as sentential operators rather than as predicates. The question therefore arises whether the notions that are investigated in tense logic can be consistently formalized as predicates. In this paper it is shown that the answer to this question is negative. The logical treatment of the notions of future and past as predicates gives rise to paradoxes due the specific interplay between both notions. For this reason, the tense paradoxes that will be presented are not identical to the paradoxes referred to above
|Keywords||tense logic tense predicates diagonalization paradox|
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
Volker Halbach (2008). On a Side Effect of Solving Fitch's Paradox by Typing Knowledge. Analysis 68 (2):114 - 120.
Leon Horsten (forthcoming). One Hundred Years of Semantic Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-15.
Volker Halbach (2006). How Not to State T-Sentences. Analysis 66 (4):276–280.
Johannes Stern & Martin Fischer (2015). Paradoxes of Interaction? Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (3):287-308.
Volker Halbach (2006). How Not to State T-Sentences. Analysis 66 (292):276-280.
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