Personal and sub-personal: A defence of Dennett's early distinction
Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24 (2000)
| Abstract | Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub-personal' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a satisfactory anti-physicalistic, anti-dualist philosophy of mind. It neither interferes with the projects of sub-personal psychology, nor encourages ; instrumentalism at the personal level | |||||||||
| Keywords | Consciousness Epistemology Metaphysics Personal Sub-personal Dennett, D | |||||||||
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