Graduate studies at Western
The Monist 91 (2):347-373 (2008)
|Abstract||We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but (we argue) highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.|
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