Response to the comments on deflationary truth and the problem of aboutness
Philosophical Issues 8:139-140 (1997)
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B. Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (2005). Deflationary Truth. Open Court Press.
John Collins (2010). Compendious Assertion and Natural Language (Generalized) Quantification : A Problem for Deflationary Truth. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
Jeffrey Hershfield (2012). Missed It By That Much: Austin on Norms of Truth. Philosophia 40 (2):357-363.
Marian David (2007). Review of P. Horwich: From a Deflationary Point of View. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (462):427-434.
Kyle Swan (2002). Emotivism and Deflationary Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):270–281.
Glen Hoffmann (2010). The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.
James O. Young (2009). Truth, Correspondence and Deflationism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):563-575.
Arvid Båve (2009). A Deflationary Theory of Reference. Synthese 169 (1):51 - 73.
Paul Horwich (1997). Deflationary Truth and the Problem of Aboutness. Philosophical Issues 8:95-106.
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