Synchronic bayesian updating and the sleeping beauty problem: Reply to Pust

Synthese 160 (2):155 - 159 (2008)
I maintain, in defending “thirdism,” that Sleeping Beauty should do Bayesian updating after assigning the “preliminary probability” 1/4 to the statement S: “Today is Tuesday and the coin flip is heads.” (This preliminary probability obtains relative to a specific proper subset I of her available information.) Pust objects that her preliminary probability for S is really zero, because she could not be in an epistemic situation in which S is true. I reply that the impossibility of being in such an epistemic situation is irrelevant, because relative to I, statement S nonetheless has degree of evidential support 1/4.
Keywords Sleeping Beauty  Probability  Epistemic probability  Preliminary probability  Credence  Bayesian updating  Synchronic Bayesian updating
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References found in this work BETA
Clark Glymour (1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton University Press.
Colin Howson (1984). Bayesianism and Support by Novel Facts. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (3):245-251.

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