The expressive role of truth in truth-conditional semantics

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):535–557 (2007)
I define 'skim semantics' to be a Davidson-style truth-conditional semantics combined with a variety of deflationism about truth. The expressive role of truth in truth-conditional semantics precludes at least some kinds of skim semantics; thus I reject the idea that the challenge to skim semantics derives solely from Davidson's explanatory ambitions, and in particular from the 'truth doctrine', the view that the concept of truth plays a central explanatory role in Davidsonian theories of meaning for a language. The fate of skim semantics is not determined by the fate of the truth doctrine, so rejecting the truth doctrine does not in itself open the way to skim semantics. I establish my thesis by showing that some recently proposed versions of skim semantics fail because of truth's expressive role. I also discuss the conditions that might permit skim semantics.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.496.x
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References found in this work BETA
A. Gupta (1993). A Critique of Deflationism. Philosophical Topics 21 (1):57-81.
Michael Williams (1999). Meaning and Deflationary Truth. Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):545-564.
Max Kölbel (2001). Two Dogmas of Davidsonian Semantics. Journal of Philosophy 98 (12):613-635.
Scott Soames (1984). What is a Theory of Truth? Journal of Philosophy 81 (8):411-429.

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