The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality

In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa. 520--533 (2002)
Abstract
What is the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality? A common picture in recent philosophy of mind has been that the phenomenal aspects and the intentional aspects of mentality are independent of one another. According to this view, the phenomenal character of certain mental states or processes”states for which there is "something it is like" to undergo them—is not intentional. Examples that are typically given of states with inherent phenomenal character are sensations, such as pains, itches, and color sensations. This view also asserts, on the other hand, that the intentionality of certain mental states and processes their "being about something" is not phenomenal. Beliefs and desires are the paradigm cases of intentional mental states. Although they are intentionally directed (i.e., they have aboutness) these mental states are not inherently phenomenal. There is nothing that it is like to be in such a state by virtue of which it is directed toward what it is about. We will call this picture separatism, because it treats phenomenal aspects of mentality and intentional aspects of mentality as mutually independent, and thus separable. Although there may be complex states that are both phenomenal and intentional, their phenomenal aspects and their intentional aspects are separable. Many philosophers who hold this picture have thought that these two aspects of mentality lead to quite different sorts of problems with respect to the project of “naturalizing the mental.†Proponents of separatism often hold that while the problem of naturalizing phenomenology poses great difficulties, the problem of naturalizing intentionality is much.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,404
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

View all 50 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

509 ( #293 of 1,103,007 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

62 ( #990 of 1,103,007 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.