David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ratio 18 (1):48-64 (2005)
The paper argues that Jackson's knowledge argument fails to undermine physicalist ontology. First, it is argued that, as this argument stands, it begs the question. Second, it is suggested that by supplementing the argument (and taking one of its premises for granted), this flaw can be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against type-physicalism; however, this flaw cannot be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against token-physicalism. The argument cannot be supplemented so as to show that experiences have properties which are illegitimate from a physicalist perspective
|Keywords||Argument Knowledge Metaphysics Physicalism Jackson, F|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Torin Alter (1998). A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 90 (1):35-56.
Terence E. Horgan (1984). Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (April):147-83.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Paul Raymont (1995). Tye's Criticism of the Knowledge Argument. Dialogue 34 (4):713-26.
Torin Alter (2006). Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument? In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. 65--76.
Emmett L. Holman (2006). Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism: Putting a New Spin on the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229-56.
William S. Robinson (2002). Jackson's Apostasy. Philosophical Studies 111 (3):277-293.
Yujin Nagasawa (2010). The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 72 (1):37 - 56.
G. Furash (1989). Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument Against Materialism. Dialogue 32 (October):1-6.
Fredrik Stjernberg, Not so Epiphenomenal Qualia. Spinning Ideas.
Torin Alter, The Knowledge Argument. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads41 ( #42,358 of 1,103,048 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #21,045 of 1,103,048 )
How can I increase my downloads?