The knowledge argument and higher-order properties

Ratio 18 (1):48-64 (2005)
The paper argues that Jackson's knowledge argument fails to undermine physicalist ontology. First, it is argued that, as this argument stands, it begs the question. Second, it is suggested that by supplementing the argument , this flaw can be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against type-physicalism; however, this flaw cannot be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against token-physicalism. The argument cannot be supplemented so as to show that experiences have properties which are illegitimate from a physicalist perspective
Keywords Argument  Knowledge  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Jackson, F
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