David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 137 (2):269 - 300 (2008)
It is often argued that the combination of deflationism about truth and the truth-conditional theory of meaning is impossible for reasons of circularity. I distinguish, and reject, two strains of circularity argument. Arguments of the first strain hold that the combination has a circular account of the order in which one comes to know the meaning of a sentence and comes to know its truth condition. I show that these arguments fail to identify any circularity. Arguments of the second strain hold that the combination has a circular explanation of the ideas or concepts of meaning and truth. I show that these arguments identify a genuine, but acceptable, circularity.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Dorit Bar-On, Claire Horisk & William G. Lycan (2000). Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1-28.
Nuel Belnap (1993). On Rigorous Definitions. Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):115 - 146.
Simon W. Blackburn (1993). Circles, Finks, Smells and Biconditionals. Philosophical Perspectives 7:259-279.
Bob Brandom (1997). From Truth to Semantics: A Path Through "Making It Explicit". Philosophical Issues 8:141-154.
John Collins (2002). Truth or Meaning? A Question of Priority. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):497-536.
Citations of this work BETA
Alexis Burgess (2011). Mainstream Semantics + Deflationary Truth. Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (5):397-410.
David Löwenstein (2012). Davidsonian Semantics and Anaphoric Deflationism. Dialectica 66 (1):23-44.
Similar books and articles
Richard Heck (2002). Meaning and Truth-Conditions: A Reply to Kemp. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87.
Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan (2000). Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.
Francesco Orilia (2000). Meaning and Circular Definitions. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):155-169.
Douglas Patterson (2005). Deflationism and the Truth Conditional Theory of Meaning. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):271 - 294.
William G. Lycan (2010). Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning. Topoi 29 (2):99-108.
Gary Kemp (2002). Reply to Heck on Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):233-236.
Huw Price (1997). What Should a Deflationist About Truth Say About Meaning? Philosophical Issues 8:107-115.
Rosanna Keefe (2002). When Does Circularity Matter? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):253–270.
Cesare Cozzo (1994). Meaning and Argument. A Theory of Meaning Centred on Immediate Argumental Role. Almqvist & Wiksell.
Lionel Shapiro (2008). Naïve Truth-Conditions and Meaning. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):265–277.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads86 ( #15,891 of 1,100,077 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #40,751 of 1,100,077 )
How can I increase my downloads?