Troubles on moral twin earth: Moral queerness revived

Synthese 92 (2):221 - 260 (1992)
J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather than sui generis; (ii) that this explanatory burden can be successfully met vis-à-vis the supervenience of the mental upon the physical, and in other related cases; and (iii) that the burden cannot be met for (putative) objective moral supervenience relations.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00414300
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1970). Mental Events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press 79-101.
Tyler Burge (1986). Individualism and Psychology. Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Victor Kumar (2015). Moral Judgment as a Natural Kind. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2887-2910.

View all 35 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

237 ( #6,038 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #74,822 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.