David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 170 (1):191 - 210 (2009)
This paper suggests a critique of the zombie argument that bypasses the need to decide on the truth of its main premises, and specifically, avoids the need to enter the battlefield of whether conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. It is argued that if we accept, as the zombie argument’s supporters would urge us, the assumption that an ideal reasoner can conceive of a complete physical description of the world without conceiving of qualia, the general principle that conceivability entails metaphysical possibility, and the general principle that for any s and t the metaphysical possibility of s & − t entails that s does not necessitate t, we have to conclude not that materialism is false but rather that either materialism or the “mental paint” (or “phenomenist”) conception of phenomenality is false. And further, given the initial advantages of materialism, the fact that proponents of the zombie argument are not allowed to rely on arguments against materialism in confronting this dilemma, and difficulties with arguments in favor of phenomenism, we find ourselves pushed to reject the mental paint conception rather than materialism. Or at any rate, it is hard to see how the proponent of the zombie argument can carry the burden of proof that lies with her. Thus, whether or not those premises of the zombie argument are true, the argument fails to refute materialism.
|Keywords||Zombie Conceivability Materialism Phenomenism Mental paint Eliminative materialism Functionalism Representationalism Intentionalism Dualism Qualia Chalmers|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jaegwon Kim (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Robert Stalnaker (2002). What is It Like to Be a Zombie? In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press 385--400.
Keith Frankish (2007). The Anti-Zombie Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):650–666.
Josh Weisberg (2011). The Zombie's Cogito: Meditations on Type-Q Materialism. Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):585 - 605.
Daniel Stoljar (2001). The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical. Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):393-413.
Daniel Stoljar (2007). Two Conceivability Arguments Compared. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):27-44.
David Robb (2008). Zombies From Below. In Simone Gozzano Francesco Orilia (ed.), Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind: Essays at the Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology. Ontos Verlag
Katalin Balog (1999). Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2008). Access Denied to Zombies. Unpublished:1-13.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads88 ( #32,257 of 1,725,237 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #59,788 of 1,725,237 )
How can I increase my downloads?