David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):25 - 51 (2009)
Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals have significant import regarding both the nature of moral normativity and the human capacity for mastering moral normativity. The morals of the frame problem bode well, we argue, for the claim that moral normativity is not fully systematizable by exceptionless general principles, and for the correlative claim that such systematizability is not required in order for humans to master moral normativity.
|Keywords||Frame problem Relevance problem Computational cognitive science Particularism Generalism Moral normativity|
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Dancy (1983). Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties. Mind 92 (368):530-547.
Jonathan Dancy (2004). Ethics Without Principles. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (1993). Moral Reasons. Blackwell.
A. C. Ewing (1959). Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy. New York, Macmillan.
Jerry A. Fodor (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Marcello Guarini (2010). Particularism, Analogy, and Moral Cognition. Minds and Machines 20 (3):385-422.
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