Philosophical Studies 125 (3):371 - 397 (2005)
|Abstract||I argue that a popular brand of deflationism about truth, disquotationalism, does not adequately account for some central varieties of truth ascription. For example, given Boyle’s Law is “The product of pressure and volume is exactly a constant for an ideal gas”, disquotationalism does not explain why the blind ascription “Boyle’s Law is true” implies that the product of pressure and volume is exactly a constant for an ideal gas, and given Washington said only “Birds sing”, disquotationalism does not explain why the existentially quantified ascription “Something Washington said is true” implies that birds sing. Thus disquotationalism fails to account for all the facts about truth.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Daniel Whiting (2011). Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):607-624.
Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan (2000). Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.
Aladdin M. Yaqub (2008). Two Types of Deflationism. Synthese 165 (1):77 - 106.
Ray Buchanan (2003). Are Truth and Reference Quasi-Disquotational? Philosophical Studies 113 (1):43 - 75.
Jeffrey Hershfield (2012). Missed It By That Much: Austin on Norms of Truth. Philosophia 40 (2):357-363.
Glen Hoffmann (2007). A Dilemma for the Weak Deflationist About Truth. Sorites 18:129-137.
Leon Horsten (2009). Levity. Mind 118 (471):555-581.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #71,234 of 722,929 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,087 of 722,929 )
How can I increase my downloads?