What should deflationism be when it grows up?

Philosophical Studies 125 (3):371 - 397 (2005)
Abstract
I argue that a popular brand of deflationism about truth, disquotationalism, does not adequately account for some central varieties of truth ascription. For example, given Boyle’s Law is “The product of pressure and volume is exactly a constant for an ideal gas”, disquotationalism does not explain why the blind ascription “Boyle’s Law is true” implies that the product of pressure and volume is exactly a constant for an ideal gas, and given Washington said only “Birds sing”, disquotationalism does not explain why the existentially quantified ascription “Something Washington said is true” implies that birds sing. Thus disquotationalism fails to account for all the facts about truth.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,404
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Michael Dummett (1959). Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.

View all 20 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

23 ( #76,570 of 1,103,008 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #120,820 of 1,103,008 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.