David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (1):53-71 (2011)
This paper attempts to establish that, and explain why, the practice of punishing offenders is in principle morally permissible. My account is a nonstandard version of the fair play view, according to which punishment 's permissibility derives from reciprocal obligations shared by members of a political community, understood as a mutually beneficial, cooperative venture. Most fair play views portray punishment as an appropriate means of removing the unfair advantage an offender gains relative to law-abiding members of the community. Such views struggle, however, to provide a plausible account of this unfairly gained benefit. By contrast, on my account punishment 's permissibility follows more straightforwardly from the fair play view of political obligation: Specifically, the rule instituting punishment is itself among those rules with which members of the political community are obliged to comply. For criminal offenders, compliance requires submitting to the prospect of punishment
|Keywords||punishment fair play political obligatioin|
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References found in this work BETA
H. L. A. Hart (1994). The Concept of Law. Oxford University Press.
Robert Nozick (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Basic Books.
H. L. A. Hart (1955). Are There Any Natural Rights? Philosophical Review 64 (2):175-191.
Citations of this work BETA
Göran Duus-Otterström (forthcoming). Fairness-Based Retributivism Reconsidered. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-18.
Stephen P. Garvey (2013). Was Ellen Wronged? Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (2):185-216.
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