David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 102 (2):168-181 (2002)
The Identity Thesis, proposed by Reid for the case of sensations, and extended by Brentano to conscious states generally, says that a state is conscious iff it is identical with introspective knowledge of its own instantiation. The Thesis offers simple explanations of a number of puzzling features of introspective self-knowledge, and unites the problems of introspection, consciousness and knowledge in the single problem of the metaphysical nature of conscious states. It does nothing to solve the latter problem, but it does entail that a functionalist account of consciousness is incomplete without an exact functionalist definition of knowledge itself
|Keywords||Consciousness Functionalism Identity Theory Metaphysics Self-knowledge|
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Yujin Nagasawa (2010). The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 72 (1):37 - 56.
Greg Janzen (2005). Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character. Dialogue 44 (4):707-733.
John N. Williams (2015). Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey. Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.
Mark Textor (2013). Brentano on the Dual Relation of the Mental. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):465-483.
Cynthia Macdonald (2008). Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Authoritative Self-Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):319-346.
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