Response to John McDowell

The Owl of Minerva 41 (1/2):39-51 (2009)
In this response, I accept some of McDowell’s criticisms of my presentation of his views in my essay, but argue that his understanding of Hegel remains problematic. In particular, I claim that he fails to see that, for Kant, intuitional unit y is inseparable from judging; that his understanding of Hegelian absolute knowing is wrong as it stands ; that he fails to see that self-consciousness aims, not to overcome the specific antithesis between self-consciousness and the empirical world, but to achieve explicit consciousness of itself in its relation to what is other, and that this requires it to relate to another self-consciousness; and that the implications of his idea that Hegel’s account of the life and death struggle and the master/slave relation is “allegorical” remain unclear
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DOI 10.5840/owl2009/2010411/224
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John McDowell (2009). Response to Stephen Houlgate. The Owl of Minerva 41 (1-2):27-38.
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