David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Research 18:109-125 (1993)
Satisficing and maximizing versions of consequentialism have both assumed that rightness is an alI-or-nothing property. We argue thal this is inimical to the spirit of consequentialism, and that, from the point of view of the consequentialist, actions should be evaluated purely in terms that admit of degree. We first consider the suggestion that rightness and wrongness are a matter of degree. If so, this raises the question of whether the claim that something is wrong says any more than that it is bad. We consider the possibility that a consequenlialist should simply equate wrongness with badness. We reject this on the grounds that there is not a satsifactory way for a consequentialist to account for the badness of actions, as opposed to states of affairs. We explore two concepts of wrongness: to do something wrong is to be blameworthy; and the fact that something is wrong creates a reason not to do it. We argue that the first of these is not available to the consequentialist because of her views on blame, and that the second is just as much a feature of badness as of wrongness. We conclude that the consequentialist can make no sense of the concept of wrongness
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Alastair Norcross (1997). Good and Bad Actions. Philosophical Review 106 (1):1-34.
Alastair Norcross (1997). Consequentialism and Commitment. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (4):380–403.
Dan Moller (2006). Killing and Dying. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):235 - 247.
Desheng Zong (2000). Agent Neutrality is the Exclusive Feature of Consequentialism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):676-693.
Jennie Louise (2006). Right Motive, Wrong Action: Direct Consequentialism and Evaluative Conflict. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (1):65 - 85.
Douglas W. Portmore (2007). Consequentializing Moral Theories. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):39–73.
Andrew C. Khoury (2011). Blameworthiness and Wrongness. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (2):135-146.
Troy Jollimore (2000). Friendship Without Partiality? Ratio 13 (1):69–82.
Edmund Henden (2007). Restrictive Consequentialism and Real Friendship. Ratio 20 (2):179–193.
Eric Reitan (2000). Does the Argument From Evil Assume a Consequentialist Morality? Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):306-319.
Richard Yetter Chappell (2012). Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):684 - 704.
David Cummiskey (2011). Korsgaard's Rejection of Consequentialism. Metaphilosophy 42 (4):360-367.
Tim Mulgan (2006). SLOTE'S SATISFICING CONSEQUENTIALISM. Ratio 6 (2):121 - 134.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads24 ( #112,516 of 1,699,804 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #77,273 of 1,699,804 )
How can I increase my downloads?