Dutch Book Arguments and Consistency

Abstract
I consider Dutch Book arguments for three principles of classical Bayesianism: (i) agents' belief-probabilities are consistent only if they obey the probability axioms. (ii) beliefs are updated by Bayesian conditionalisation. (iii) that the so-called Principal Principle connects statistical and belief probabilities. I argue that while there is a sound Dutch Book argument for (i), the standard ones for (ii) based on the Lewis-Teller strategy are unsound, for reasons pointed out by Christensen. I consider a type of Dutch Book argument for (iii), where the statistical probability is a von Mises one.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,351
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Patrick Maher (1997). Depragmatized Dutch Book Arguments. Philosophy of Science 64 (2):291-305.
    Brian Weatherson (1999). Begging the Question and Bayesians. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30:687-697.
    Alan Hájek (2008). Arguments for–or Against–Probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793 - 819.
    Colin Howson (2008). De Finetti, Countable Additivity, Consistency and Coherence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):1-23.
    Alan Hájek (2005). Scotching Dutch Books? Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):139–151.
    Brad Armendt (1992). Dutch Strategies for Diachronic Rules: When Believers See the Sure Loss Coming. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:217 - 229.
    J. Williamson (1999). Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):401-416.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2011-05-29

    Total downloads

    4 ( #198,443 of 1,088,371 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,449 of 1,088,371 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.