David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):1-23 (2008)
Many people believe that there is a Dutch Book argument establishing that the principle of countable additivity is a condition of coherence. De Finetti himself did not, but for reasons that are at first sight perplexing. I show that he rejected countable additivity, and hence the Dutch Book argument for it, because countable additivity conflicted with intuitive principles about the scope of authentic consistency constraints. These he often claimed were logical in nature, but he never attempted to relate this idea to deductive logic and its own concept of consistency. This I do, showing that at one level the definitions of deductive and probabilistic consistency are identical, differing only in the nature of the constraints imposed. In the probabilistic case I believe that R.T. Cox's scale-free axioms for subjective probability are the most suitable candidates. 1 Introduction 2 Coherence and Consistency 3 The Infinite Fair Lottery 4 The Puzzle Resolved—But Replaced by Another 5 Countable Additivity, Conglomerability and Dutch Books 6 The Probability Axioms and Cox's Theorem 7 Truth and Probability 8 Conclusion: Logical Omniscience CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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Citations of this work BETA
Chunlai Zhou (2010). Probability Logic of Finitely Additive Beliefs. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):247-282.
Colin Howson (2012). Modelling Uncertain Inference. Synthese 186 (2):475-492.
Colin Howson (2013). Hume's Theorem. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):339-346.
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