David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):18–24 (2005)
Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are arbitrary. I argue that this dilemma is not nearly as decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe.
|Keywords||Foundationalism epistemic regress regress problem infinitism Peter Klein|
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Citations of this work BETA
Coos Engelsma (2015). Arbitrary Foundations? On Klein’s Objection to Foundationalism. Acta Analytica 30 (4):389-408.
Scott F. Aikin (2008). Meta-Epistemology and the Varieties of Epistemic Infinitism. Synthese 163 (2):175 - 185.
Ted Poston (2012). Basic Reasons and First Philosophy: A Coherentist View of Reasons. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93.
Coos Engelsma (2014). On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness. Metaphilosophy 45 (2):192-200.
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