Graduate studies at Western
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):18–24 (2005)
|Abstract||Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are arbitrary. I argue that this dilemma is not nearly as decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe.|
|Keywords||Foundationalism epistemic regress regress problem infinitism Peter Klein|
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