David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Michael Peterson & Raymond Van Arrogan (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell. 140--55 (2003)
Preprinted in God and the Problem of Evil(Blackwell 2001), ed. William Rowe. Many people deny that evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. After all, they say, the grounds for belief in God are much better than the evidence for atheism, including the evidence provided by evil. We will not join their ranks on this occasion. Rather, we wish to consider the proposition that, setting aside grounds for belief in God and relying only on the background knowledge shared in common by nontheists and theists, evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. Our aim is to argue against this proposition. We recognize that in doing so, we face a formidable challenge. It’s one thing to say that evil presents a reason for atheism that is, ultimately, overridden by arguments for theism. It’s another to say that it doesn’t so much as provide us with a reason for atheism in the first place. In order to make this latter claim seem initially more plausible, consider the apparent design of the mammalian eye or the apparent fine-tuning of the universe to support life. These are often proposed as reasons to believe in theism. Critics commonly argue not merely that these supposed reasons for theism are overridden by arguments for atheism but rather that they aren’t good reasons for theism in the first place. Our parallel proposal with respect to evil and atheism is, initially at least, no less plausible than this proposal with respect to apparent design and theism.
|Keywords||problem of evil argument from evil atheism theism Rowe|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Mikael Stenmark (1998). The End of the Theism–Atheism Debate? A Response to Vincent Brümmer. Religious Studies 34 (3):261-280.
Michael Almeida (2004). The New Evidential Argument Defeated. Philo 7 (1):22-35.
D. Howard-Snyder (2000). God and Inscrutable Evil: In Defense of Theism and Atheism. Philosophical Review 109 (4):617-621.
Lara Denis (2003). Kant's Criticism of Atheism. Kant-Studien 94 (2):198-219.
Justin P. McBrayer (2010). Skeptical Theism. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):611-623.
Daniel Howard-Snyder (2005). On Rowe's Argument From Particular Horrors. In Kelly Clark (ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Religion. Broadview.
Daniel Howard-Snyder & John Hawthorne (1994). On the a Priori Rejection of Evidential Arguments From Evil. Sophia:33-47.
Robert Lehe (2009). The Nihilistic Consequences of the Argument From Evil. International Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):427-437.
A. M. Weisberger (1999). Suffering Belief: Evil and the Anglo-American Defense of Theism. Peter Lang.
David O'Connor (1998). God and Inscrutable Evil: In Defense of Theism and Atheism. Rowman & Littlefield.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads107 ( #10,142 of 1,102,881 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #62,002 of 1,102,881 )
How can I increase my downloads?