No Answer to Hume

Abstract
In a recent article in this journal, Daniel Steel charges me with committing a fallacy in my discussion of inductive rules. I show that the charge is false, and that Steel's own attempt to validate enumerative induction in terms of formal learning theory is itself fallacious. I go on to argue that, contra Steel, formal learning theory is in principle incapable of answering Hume's famous claim that any attempt to justify induction will beg the question
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References found in this work BETA
David Chart (2000). Schulte and Goodman's Riddle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1):147 - 149.

View all 7 references

Citations of this work BETA
Daniel Steel (2011). On Not Changing the Problem: A Reply to Howson. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (3):285 - 291.
Colin Howson (2013). Hume's Theorem. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):339-346.
Similar books and articles
Daniel Steel (2011). On Not Changing the Problem: A Reply to Howson. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (3):285 - 291.
Peter Lipton (2005). Waiting for Hume. In Marina Frasca-Spada & P. J. E. Kail (eds.), Impressions of Hume. Oxford University Press. 59.
John D. Norton (2003). A Material Theory of Induction. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
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