On an “Unintelligible” Idea: Donald Davidson's Case Against Experiential Foundationalism

Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):523-555 (2002)
Donald Davidson’s epistemology is predicated on, among other things, the rejection of Experiential Foundationalism, which he calls ‘unintelligible’. In this essay, I assess Davidson’s arguments for this conclusion. I conclude that each of them fails on the basis of reasons that foundationalists and antifoundationalists alike can, and should, accept.
Keywords foundationalism  epistemology  the given  Donald Davidson  basic belief
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