On an “Unintelligible” Idea: Donald Davidson's Case Against Experiential Foundationalism

Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):523-555 (2002)
Donald Davidson’s epistemology is predicated on, among other things, the rejection of Experiential Foundationalism, which he calls ‘unintelligible’. In this essay, I assess Davidson’s arguments for this conclusion. I conclude that each of them fails on the basis of reasons that foundationalists and antifoundationalists alike can, and should, accept.
Keywords foundationalism  epistemology  the given  Donald Davidson  basic belief
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2002.tb01915.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Daniel Howard-Snyder, On an “Unintelligible” Idea: Donald Davidson's Case Against Experiential Foundationalism
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
James Pearson (2011). Distinguishing W.V. Quine and Donald Davidson. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (1):1-22.
D. J. MacDermid (2004). Is Davidson's Epistemology Coherent? Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):101-130.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

187 ( #21,009 of 1,932,585 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

57 ( #6,591 of 1,932,585 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.