David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Facta Philosophica 7 (2):231-253 (2005)
Mark Johnston claims the pragmatist theory of truth is inconsistent with the way we actually employ and talk about that concept. He is, however, sympathetic enough to attempt to rescue its respectable core using ‘response-dependence’, a revisionary form of which he advocates as a method for clarifying various philosophically significant concepts. But Johnston has misrepresented pragmatism; it does not require rescuing, and as I show here, his ‘missing explanation argument’ against pragmatism therefore fails. What Johnston and other critics including Putnam have overlooked is the distinctive nature of the pragmatist strategy, specifically, that it is non-reductive, a characteristic it shares with a more promising form of response-dependence; what Johnston calls ‘Descriptive Protagoreanism’ (DP). In this paper I offer a defence of pragmatism and show how it might be re-articulated as a form of DP.
|Keywords||pragmatism response-dependence realism truth concepts semantics color|
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References found in this work BETA
B. D. Ellis (2001). Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge University Press.
Simon Blackburn (2008). The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford ;Oxford University Press.
Hilary Putnam (2000). The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body and World. Columbia University Press.
Christopher Hookway (2000). Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism: Themes From Peirce. Oxford University Press.
Mark Johnston (1993). Objectivity Refigured: Pragmatism Without Verificationism. In John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford University Press 85--130.
Citations of this work BETA
Andrew W. Howat (2006). Review: David L. Hildebrand. Beyond Realism & Anti-Realism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2003. [REVIEW] Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (2):296-302.
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