Regulative Assumptions, Hinge Propositions and the Peircean Conception of Truth
Erkenntnis 78 (2):451-468 (2013)
| Abstract | This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are popularly called ‘hinge propositions’ | |||||||||
| Keywords | Peirce Truth Wittgenstein Hinge Propositions Regulative Ideas | |||||||||
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