David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theory and Decision 44 (3):231-278 (1998)
In his Truth and Probability (1926), Frank Ramsey provides foundations for measures of degrees of belief in propositions and preferences for worlds. Nonquantitative conditions on preferences for worlds, and gambles for worlds and certain near-worlds, are formulated which he says insure that a subject's preferences for worlds are represented by numbers, world values. Numbers, for his degrees of belief in propositions, probabilities, are then defined in terms of his world values. Ramsey does not also propose definitions of desirabilities for propositions, though he is in a position to do this. Given his measures for probabilities of propositions and values of worlds, he can frame natural definitions for both evidential and causal desirabilities that would measure respectively the welcomeness of propositions as items of news, and as facts. His theory is neutral with respect to the evidential/causal division. In the present paper, as Ramsey's foundations are explained, several problems and limitations are noted. Their distinctive virtue â their evidential/causal neutrality â is demonstrated. Comparisons are made with other foundational schemes, and a perspective is recommended from which nonquantitative foundations are not the be all for quantitative theories of ideal preferences and credences
|Keywords||Ramsey Evidential and Causal decision theory Probability Foundations|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Frank Plumpton Ramsey & D. H. Mellor (eds.) (1980). Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F. P. Ramsey. Cambridge University Press.
Till Grüne-Yanoff (2007). Proposition-Preferences and World-Preferences. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:147-152.
Jonathan Schaffer (2012). Necessitarian Propositions. Synthese 189 (1):119-162.
Richard Holton & Huw Price (2003). Ramsey on Saying and Whistling: A Discordant Note. Noûs 37 (2):325–341.
Francesco Berto (2010). Impossible Worlds and Propositions: Against the Parity Thesis. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):471-486.
Huw Price (2003). Ramsey on Saying and Whistling: A Discordant Note. Noûs 37 (2):325 - 341.
Jordan Howard Sobel (2004). On Wakker's Critique of Allais-Preferences. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):253-272.
Sam Cowling (2011). The Limits of Modality. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):473-495.
Wei Xiong (2011). Implications of the Dutch Book: Following Ramsey’s Axioms. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (2):334-344.
Greg Restall (1997). Ways Things Can't Be. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):583-596.
Phillip Bricker (1983). Worlds and Propositions: The Structure and Ontology of Logical Space. Dissertation, Princeton University
Jeffrey C. King (2013). On Fineness of Grain. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):763-781.
Richard Bradley (2007). A Unified Bayesian Decision Theory. Theory and Decision 63 (3):233-263,.
Patrick Suppes (2006). Ramsey's Psychological Theory of Belief. In Maria Carla Galavotti (ed.), Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. 35-53.
John C. Bigelow (1979). Quantum Probability in Logical Space. Philosophy of Science 46 (2):223-243.
Added to index2010-09-02
Total downloads5 ( #264,553 of 1,692,469 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #184,284 of 1,692,469 )
How can I increase my downloads?