Subjective probabilities and betting quotients

Synthese 81 (1):1 - 8 (1989)
This paper addresses the problem of why the conditions under which standard proofs of the Dutch Book argument proceed should ever be met. In particular, the condition that there should be odds at which you would be willing to bet indifferently for or against are hardly plausible in practice, and relaxing it and applying Dutch book considerations gives only the theory of upper and lower probabilities. It is argued that there are nevertheless admittedly rather idealised circumstances in which the classic form of the Dutch Book argument is valid.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00869341
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 21,496
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Patricia Baillie (1973). Confirmation and the Dutch Book Argument. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (4):393-397.
Ernest W. Adams (1964). On Rational Betting Systems. Archiv für Mathematische Logik Und Grundlagenforschung 6:7-29.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

40 ( #106,518 of 1,911,837 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

13 ( #46,256 of 1,911,837 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.