Some varieties of free will worth practicing

Discusses freedom of will as being agentically independent of nonagentic coercion in actions and as choosing how to become faithfully interdependent. Recent experimental developments that demonstrated the causal force of the will in human actions reveal a picture of human action as partially self-determined and partially caused by nonagentic causal influences acting upon these agents. A 2nd manner of influence is when humans choose to become faithfully interdependent by becoming a believer in any number of foundational stories that give meaning to life and human actions. By joining into a set of story-perspectives, agents choose to limit their range of action in certain domains; they develop virtues and avoid vices deemed important by that community. It is suggested that agents choose to become a certain kind of person through the theological, political, or philosophical commitments that they make in life. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords causal force of free will & belief in foundational stories in development of faithful interdependence
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DOI 10.1037/h0091128
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Paul Benson (1994). Free Agency and Self-Worth. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):650-58.
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