Three arguments against foundationalism: arbitrariness, epistemic regress, and existential support

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564 (2007)
Abstract
Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
Keywords foundationalism  epistemology  Ernest Sosa  Peter Klein  infinitism  epistemic regress  regress problem  regress
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PhilPapers Archive Daniel Howard-Snyder, Three arguments against foundationalism: arbitrariness, epistemic regress, and existential support
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Michael Rescorla (2009). Shifting the Burden of Proof? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):86-109.
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