Reconsidering the miracle argument on the supposition of transient underdetermination

Synthese 180 (2):173 - 187 (2011)
In this paper, I will show that the Miracle Argument is unsound if one assumes a certain form of transient underdetermination. For this aim, I will first discuss and formalize several variants of underdetermination, especially that of transient underdetermination, by means of measure theory. I will then formalize a popular and persuasive form of the Miracle Argument that is based on "use novelty". I will then proceed to the proof that the miracle argument is unsound by means of a mathematical example. Finally, I will expose two hidden presuppositions of the Miracle Argument that make it so immensely though deceptively persuasive
Keywords Miracle argument  Putnam  Transient underdetermination  Formal arguments  Scientific realism
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DOI 10.2307/41477551
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Willard V. O. Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.

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