David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 139 (2):181 - 189 (2008)
This paper presents a new analysis of C.G. Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation [Hempel C. G. (1945). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: The Free Press, pp. 3–51.], differing from the one Carnap gave in §87 of his [1962. Logical foundations of probability (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.]. Hempel, it is argued, felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at true hypotheses and another aiming at informative hypotheses. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative hypotheses. I then show that one can have Hempel’s cake and eat it too. There is a logic that takes into account both of these two conflicting aspects. According to this logic, a sentence H is an acceptable hypothesis for evidence E if and only if H is both sufficiently plausible given E and sufficiently informative about E. Finally, the logic sheds new light on Carnap’s analysis.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy of Religion Philosophy of Mind Epistemology Logic Philosophy|
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References found in this work BETA
Rudolf Carnap (1962). Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Isaac Levi (1967). Gambling with Truth. Cambridge,MIT Press.
Branden Fitelson (1999). The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):378.
Carl G. Hempel & Paul Oppenheim (1948). Studies in the Logic of Explanation. Philosophy of Science 15 (2):135-175.
Citations of this work BETA
Tomoji Shogenji (2012). The Degree of Epistemic Justification and the Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 184 (1):29-48.
Frank Cabrera (forthcoming). Can There Be a Bayesian Explanationism? On the Prospects of a Productive Partnership. Synthese:1-28.
Jan Sprenger (2013). A Synthesis of Hempelian and Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation. Erkenntnis 78 (4):727-738.
Jesús Zamora-Bonilla (2013). Why Are Good Theories Good? Reflections on Epistemic Values, Confirmation, and Formal Epistemology. Synthese 190 (9):1533-1553.
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