Philosophical Studies 139 (2):181 - 189 (2008)
|Abstract||This paper presents a new analysis of C.G. Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation [Hempel C. G. (1945). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: The Free Press, pp. 3–51.], differing from the one Carnap gave in §87 of his [1962. Logical foundations of probability (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.]. Hempel, it is argued, felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at true hypotheses and another aiming at informative hypotheses. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative hypotheses. I then show that one can have Hempel’s cake and eat it too. There is a logic that takes into account both of these two conflicting aspects. According to this logic, a sentence H is an acceptable hypothesis for evidence E if and only if H is both sufficiently plausible given E and sufficiently informative about E. Finally, the logic sheds new light on Carnap’s analysis.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Carl A. Hempel (1983). Studies in the Logic of Confirmation. In Peter Achinstein (ed.), The Concept of Evidence. Oxford University Press.
Franz Huber (2007). The Logic of Theory Assessment. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5):511-538.
Branden Fitelson (2006). The Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
Franz Huber (2008). Assessing Theories, Bayes Style. Synthese 161 (1):89 - 118.
G. H. Merrill (1979). Confirmation and Prediction. Philosophy of Science 46 (1):98-117.
C. A. Hooker (1968). Goodman, 'Grue' and Hempel. Philosophy of Science 35 (3):232-247.
Franz Huber, Confirmation and Induction. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Wesley C. Salmon (1977). Hempel's Conception of Inductive Inference in Inductive-Statistical Explanation. Philosophy of Science 44 (2):179-185.
James Hawthorne (2011). Confirmation Theory. In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7. Elsevier.
Franz Huber (2005). The Logic of Confirmation and Theory Assessment. In L. Behounek & M. Bilkova (eds.), The Logica Yearbook. Filosofia.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads32 ( #43,395 of 722,813 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,813 )
How can I increase my downloads?