Noûs 30 (1):31-54 (1996)
|Abstract||Many philosophers have thought that what one has reason to do is what one would be motivated to do under certain idealized conditions: full information, vivid awareness, etc. I call such theories, "hypothetical motivation theories of reasons for action" and argue that they are fundamentally mistaken in a way that cannot be corrected by alterations in the idealizing conditions. I propose, in their place, an "actual intrinsic motivation account" which holds that one has reason to do whatever promotes those ends one is actually 'intrinsically' motivated to pursue.|
|Keywords||practical reasons Humeanism idealization motivation desire|
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