Milne's Argument for the Log‐Ratio Measure

Philosophy of Science 75 (4):413-420 (2008)
Abstract
This article shows that a slight variation of the argument in Milne 1996 yields the log‐likelihood ratio l rather than the log‐ratio measure r as “the one true measure of confirmation. ” *Received December 2006; revised December 2007. †To contact the author, please write to: Formal Epistemology Research Group, Zukunftskolleg and Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, P.O. Box X906, 78457 Konstanz, Germany; e‐mail: franz.huber@uni‐konstanz.de
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/595838
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Franz Huber, Milne's Argument for the Log‐Ratio Measure
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Branden Fitelson (2001). Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Franz Huber (2005). What Is the Point of Confirmation? Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1146-1159.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Peter Brössel & Franz Huber (2015). Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):737-749.
Peter Brössel & Franz Huber (2014). Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (4):axu004.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

79 ( #54,013 of 1,907,621 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

17 ( #37,415 of 1,907,621 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.