Milne's Argument for the Log‐Ratio Measure

Philosophy of Science 75 (4):413-420 (2008)
This article shows that a slight variation of the argument in Milne 1996 yields the log‐likelihood ratio l rather than the log‐ratio measure r as <span class='Hi'></span>“the one true measure of confirmation.<span class='Hi'></span>” <span class='Hi'></span>*Received December 2006;<span class='Hi'></span> revised December 2007.<span class='Hi'></span> †To contact the author,<span class='Hi'></span> please write to:<span class='Hi'></span> Formal Epistemology Research Group,<span class='Hi'></span> Zukunftskolleg and Department of Philosophy,<span class='Hi'></span> University of Konstanz,<span class='Hi'></span> P.O.<span class='Hi'></span> Box X906,<span class='Hi'></span> 78457 Konstanz,<span class='Hi'></span> Germany;<span class='Hi'></span> e‐mail:<span class='Hi'></span> franz.huber@uni‐
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DOI 10.1086/595838
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PhilPapers Archive Franz Huber, Milne's Argument for the Log‐Ratio Measure
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References found in this work BETA
Branden Fitelson (2001). Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Philip Percival (2002). Epistemic Consequentialism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):121–151.

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