David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 49 (6):573 – 590 (2006)
Is intentionality possible without representation? This paper considers the conditions under which intentionality without representation could occur and what sort of perceptual content such intentionality would have. In addition, it considers the constraints on non-representational intentional content in organisms that have representation. The paper is divided into three parts. The first section compares and contrasts two opposed positions on non-representational intentionality, those of Herbert Dreyfus and John Searle. The second section reviews a neurobiological model that accommodates the possibility of non-representational perceptual content. The final section provides a puzzle for theories of non-representational perceptual content, specifically in connection with the perception of representations. The puzzle of representation and perception illustrates a further need for all theories of perception, both philosophical and scientific: to provide a more finely developed definition of the notion of representation.
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Judy S. DeLoache & Nancy M. Burns (1994). Early Understanding of the Representational Function of Pictures. Cognition 52 (2):83-110.
Hubert L. Dreyfus (1999). The Primacy of Phenomenology Over Logical Analysis: A Critique of Searle. Philosophical Topics 27 (2):3-24.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Sean D. Kelly (2001). The Non-Conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):601-608.
Citations of this work BETA
Donnchadh O'Conaill (2013). On Being Motivated. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):579-595.
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