Pritchard's angst

Acta Analytica 21 (3):85-92 (2006)
In this paper, I raise some questions about Pritchard’s (2005) internalist argument for scepticism. I argue that his internalism begs the question in support of scepticism. Correlatively I advance what I take to be a better internalist argument for scepticism, one that leaves open the possibility of empirically adjudicating sceptical hypotheses. I close by discussing what it means to be an internalist.
Keywords Duncan Pritchard  scepticism  internalism  epistemology  brain-in-a-vat
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-006-1011-0
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References found in this work BETA
Fred I. Dretske (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
Duncan Pritchard (2005). Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.

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