Graduate studies at Western
Acta Analytica 21 (3):85-92 (2006)
|Abstract||In this paper, I raise some questions about Pritchard’s (2005) internalist argument for scepticism. I argue that his internalism begs the question in support of scepticism. Correlatively I advance what I take to be a better internalist argument for scepticism, one that leaves open the possibility of empirically adjudicating sceptical hypotheses. I close by discussing what it means to be an internalist.|
|Keywords||Duncan Pritchard scepticism internalism epistemology brain-in-a-vat|
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