Reliability, pragmatic and epistemic

Erkenntnis 40 (1):71 - 86 (1994)
Experimental data are often acclaimed on the grounds that they can be consistently generated. They are, it is said, reproducible. In this paper I describe how this feature of experimental-data (their pragmatic reliability) leads to their epistemic worth (their epistemic reliability). An important part of my description is the supposition that experimental procedures are to certain extent fixed and stable. Various illustrations from the actual practice of science are introduced, the most important coming at the end of the paper with a discussion of Ray Davis' 1967 solar-neutrino detection experiment (as it is portrayed in Pinch, 1980).
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DOI 10.1007/BF01128716
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1984). Observation Reconsidered. Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.
Peter Galison (1990). How Experiments End. Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):103-106.

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