Causation as simultaneous and continuous

Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):556–565 (2003)
We propose that all actual causes are simultaneous with their direct effects, as illustrated by both everyday examples and the laws of physics. We contrast this view with the sequential conception of causation, according to which causes must occur prior to their effects. The key difference between the two views of causation lies in differing assumptions about the mathematical structure of time
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00331
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Alex Baia (2012). Presentism and the Grounding of Truth. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.
Andrew M. Bailey (2012). Incompatibilism and the Past. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Metaphysics and Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press 75-96.
Brad Weslake (forthcoming). A Partial Theory of Actual Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
A. David Kline (1980). Are There Cases of Simultaneous Causation? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:292 - 301.
Jay F. Rosenberg (1998). Kant and the Problem of Simultaneous Causation. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):167 – 188.
Menno Hulswit (2005). How Causal is Downward Causation? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):261 - 287.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

71 ( #47,891 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

13 ( #53,688 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.