Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness: Does anyone care about functional zombies? [Book Review]
Graduate studies at Western
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):133-155 (2010)
|Abstract||It would be a mistake to deny commonsense intuitions a role in developing a theory of consciousness. However, philosophers have traditionally failed to probe commonsense in a way that allows these commonsense intuitions to make a robust contribution to a theory of consciousness. In this paper, I report the results of two experiments on purportedly phenomenal states and I argue that many disputes over the philosophical notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ are misguided—they fail to capture the interesting connection between commonsense ascriptions of pain and emotion. With this data in hand, I argue that our capacity to distinguish between ‘mere things’ and ‘subjects of moral concern’ rests, to a significant extent, on the sorts of mental states that we take a system to have.|
|Keywords||Folk-psychology Consciousness Cyborgs Phenomenal consciousness|
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