David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30-55 (2007)
I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that thedemand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair or question-begging one
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Citations of this work BETA
Paul Silva Jr (2013). Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589.
Paul Silva Jr (2013). How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.
Nicholas Silins (2012). Explaining Perceptual Entitlement. Erkenntnis 76 (2):243-261.
Steven L. Reynolds (2013). Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.
Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083.
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