Elusive freedom? A reply to Helen Beebee

Philosophical Review 113 (3):411-416 (2004)
I defend my earlier argument for incompatibilism, against Helen Beebee’s reply. Beebee’s reply would allow one to have free will despite that nothing one does counts as an exercise of that freedom, and would grant one the ability to do A even when one’s doing A requires something to happen that one cannot bring about and that in fact will not happen.
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-113-3-411
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