Ethical Intuitionism

Palgrave Macmillan (2005)
This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and shows that the alternative theories about the nature of ethics all face grave difficulties.
Keywords Ethical intuitionism  Ethics  Intuition
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Call number BJ1472.H84 2005
ISBN(s) 0230573746   1403989680  
DOI 10.5840/newscholas197044351
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Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Intuitions Are Like. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
Robert Audi (2008). Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475 - 492.

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