Epistemic possibility

Synthese 156 (1):119 - 142 (2007)
Seven proposed accounts of epistemic possibility are criticized, and a new account is proposed, making use of the notion of having justification for dismissing a proposition. The new account explains intuitions about otherwise puzzling cases, upholds plausible general principles about epistemic possibility, and explains the practical import of epistemic modality judgements. It is suggested that judgements about epistemic possibility function to assess which propositions are worthy of further inquiry.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Language   Metaphysics   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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References found in this work BETA
George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press 71--125.
Keith DeRose (1991). Epistemic Possibilities. Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.

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Citations of this work BETA
Isaac Record (2013). Technology and Epistemic Possibility. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie (2):1-18.
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