Fumerton's Principle of Inferential Justification

Abstract
Richard Fumerton’s “Principle of Inferential Justification” holds that, in order to be justified in believing P on the basis of E, one must be justified in believing that E makes P probable. I argue that the plausibility of this principle rests upon two kinds of mistakes: first, a level confusion; and second, a fallacy of misconditionalisation. Furthermore, Fumerton’s principle leads to skepticism about inferential justification, for which reason it should be rejected. Instead, the examples Fumerton uses to motivate his principle can be accounted for using a different principle: in order for S to be justified in believing P on the basis of E, it must be true that E makes P probable. The latter principle can be independently motivated and does not lead to skepticism
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,322
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
David J. Alexander (2012). Weak Inferential Internalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 37:357-377.
Andrew D. Cling (2003). Self-Supporting Arguments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):279–303.
Michael Strevens (1995). A Closer Look at the 'New' Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):545-561.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-04-05

Total downloads

29 ( #57,167 of 1,096,519 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #47,418 of 1,096,519 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.