Genuinely collective emotions

Abstract
It is received wisdom in philosophy and the cognitive sciences that individuals can be in emotional states but groups cannot. But why should we accept this view? In this paper, I argue that there is substantial philosophical and empirical support for the existence of collective emotions. Thus, while there is good reason to be skeptical about many ascriptions of collective emotion, I argue that some groups exhibit the computational complexity and informational integration required for being in genuinely emotional states
Keywords Distributed cognition  Emotion
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References found in this work BETA
D. H. M. Brooks (1986). Group Minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (December):456-70.

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