Logical properties of warrant

Philosophical Studies 122 (2):171 - 182 (2005)
Abstract
Trenton Merricks argues that on any reasonable account, warrant must entailtruth. I demonstrate three theses about the properties ofwarrant: (1) Warrant is not unique;there are many properties that satisfy the definition of warrant. (2) Warrant need not entail truth; there are some warrant properties that entailtruthand others that do not. (3) Warrant need not be closed under entailment, even if knowledge is. If knowledge satisfies closure, then some warrant properties satisfy closure while others do not;if knowledge violates closure, then allwarrant properties violate closure.
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References found in this work BETA
Trenton Merricks (1997). More on Warrant's Entailing Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):627-631.
Trenton Merricks (1995). Warrant Entails Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):841-855.

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Citations of this work BETA
Andrew M. Bailey (2010). Warrant is Unique. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):297-304.
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