David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 54 (3):375-397 (2001)
The problem of induction and the problem of Cartesian/brain-in-the-vat skepticism have much in common. Both are instances of a general problem of defeasible justification . I use the term "defeasible justification" to refer to a relation between a piece of evidence.
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Daniele Sgaravatti (2014). Scepticism, Defeasible Evidence and Entitlement. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):439-455.
Elia Zardini (2014). Possibility, Necessity and Probability: A Meditation on Underdetermination and Justification. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 79 (3):639-667.
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