Troubles with stereotypes for spinozan minds

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1):63-92 (2009)
Some people succeed in adopting feminist ideals in spite of the prevalence of asymmetric power relations. However, those who adopt such ideals face a number of psychological difficulties in inhibiting stereotype-based judgments. I argue that a Spinozan theory of belief fixation offers a more complete understanding of the mechanisms that underwrite our intuitive stereotype-based judgments. I also argue that a Spinozan theory of belief fixation offers resources for avoiding stereotype-based judgments where they are antecedently recognized to be pernicious and insidious. Key Words: Spinozan theory of mind • stereotypes • feminism • dual-process theory.
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