Values and morals: Outline of a skeptical realism

Philosophical Issues 19 (1):113-130 (2009)
I propose a skeptical form of moral realism, according to which, while there are objective values, many of the evaluative properties appealed to in common sense moral thinking, particularly “thick” evaluative properties, may be illusory. I suggest that “immorality” may be an example of a thick evaluative term that denotes no real property.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2009.00161.x
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Michael Huemer (2013). An Ontological Proof of Moral Realism. Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):259-279.

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