Van Inwagen's consequence argument

Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544 (2000)
Peter van Inwagen’s argument for incompatibilism uses a sentential operator, “N”, which can be read as “No one has any choice about the fact that . . . .” I show that, given van Inwagen’s understanding of the notion of having a choice, the argument is invalid. However, a different interpretation of “N” can be given, such that the argument is clearly valid, the premises remain highly plausible, and the conclusion implies that free will is incompatible with determinism.
Keywords Consequence  Determinism  Free Will  Incompatibility  Metaphysics  Possible World  Van Inwagen, P
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-109-4-525
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Andrew M. Bailey (2012). Incompatibilism and the Past. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.
Yishai Cohen (2015). Molinists Cannot Endorse the Consequence Argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):231-246.
Peter A. Graham (2010). Against the Mind Argument. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):273 - 294.

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